Après avoir pris connaissance des résultats du vote effectué dans l'un de nos précédents articles , nous avons décidé de discuter plus en détail de la question de l'organisation du fuzzing. De plus, dans le cadre de la réunion en ligne sur la sécurité de l'information «Digital Security ON AIR», nous avons présenté un rapport basé sur notre expérience en DevSecOps , où nous avons également abordé ce sujet intéressant.

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#include "MyAPI.h"

extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) {
  MyAPI_ProcessInput(Data, Size);
  return 0;
}

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<!--
INFO: Seed: 2240819152
INFO: Loaded 1 modules   (6 inline 8-bit counters): 6 [0x565e90, 0x565e96), 
INFO: Loaded 1 PC tables (6 PCs): 6 [0x541908,0x541968), 
INFO: -max_len is not provided; libFuzzer will not generate inputs larger than 4096 bytes
INFO: A corpus is not provided, starting from an empty corpus
#2  INITED cov: 3 ft: 4 corp: 1/1b lim: 4 exec/s: 0 rss: 35Mb
=================================================================
==29562==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7fff2fba1ba0 at pc 0x0000004dda61 bp 0x7fff2fba1b30 sp 0x7fff2fba12d0
WRITE of size 65 at 0x7fff2fba1ba0 thread T0
    #0 0x4dda60 in strcpy (/home/user/Documents/tmp/main+0x4dda60)
    #1 0x52540f in MyAPI_ProcessInput(char const*) (/home/user/Documents/tmp/main+0x52540f)
    #2 0x52561e in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput (/home/user/Documents/tmp/main+0x52561e)
    #3 0x42fe0a in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/user/Documents/tmp/main+0x42fe0a)
    #4 0x42f3a5 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool*) (/home/user/Documents/tmp/main+0x42f3a5)
    #5 0x4310ee in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() (/home/user/Documents/tmp/main+0x4310ee)
    #6 0x431dc5 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::vector<std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> >, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > > > const&) (/home/user/Documents/tmp/main+0x431dc5)
    #7 0x427df0 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/user/Documents/tmp/main+0x427df0)
    #8 0x44b402 in main (/home/user/Documents/tmp/main+0x44b402)
    #9 0x7f7ee294409a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a)
    #10 0x421909 in _start (/home/user/Documents/tmp/main+0x421909)

Address 0x7fff2fba1ba0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 96 in frame
    #0 0x5252ef in MyAPI_ProcessInput(char const*) (/home/user/Documents/tmp/main+0x5252ef)

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 96) 'buf' <== Memory access at offset 96 overflows this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
      (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow (/home/user/Documents/tmp/main+0x4dda60) in strcpy
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x100065f6c320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100065f6c330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100065f6c340: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100065f6c350: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100065f6c360: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00
=>0x100065f6c370: 00 00 00 00[f3]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100065f6c380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100065f6c390: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f8 f3 f3 f3
  0x100065f6c3a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100065f6c3b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100065f6c3c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
  Shadow gap:              cc
==29562==ABORTING
MS: 1 InsertRepeatedBytes-; base unit: adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc
0xa,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,
\x0a\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff
artifact_prefix='./'; Test unit written to ./crash-76387a0aaeb6a1d2b6b6f095ab49c927c00243e5
-->

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# Step 1
add_custom_target(${FUZZ_TARGET_NAME})

# Step 2
function(add_fuzzer name path)
    add_executable(${name} ${SRC} ${path})
    target_compile_options(...)
    set_target_properties(...)
    add_dependencies(${FUZZ_TARGET_NAME} ${name})

# Step 3
set(fuzzers my_ideal_fuzzer1 my_ideal_fuzzer2 ...)
foreach(fuzzer ${fuzzers})
    add_fuzzer(${fuzzer} ${FUZZERS_DIR})
endforeach()

cmake :

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• d1g1
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: dukebarman poulix

• 25 Years of Fuzzing
• —
• AFL
• The Art, Science, and Engineering of Fuzzing: A Survey
• Pulling JPEG out of thin airl
• AFL dictionaries
• Building Secure and Reliable Systems
• Fuzzing for Software Security Testing and Quality Assurance
• Recent Papers Related To Fuzzing